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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 THE HAGUE 000283

SIPDIS

STATE FOR AC/CB, NP/CBM, VC/CCB, L/ACV, IO/S
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP
JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC
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NSC FOR CHUPA
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TAGS: [PARM](#) [PREL](#) [CWC](#)

SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): WRAP-UP FOR 30
JAN

Classified By: ERIC M. JAVITS, AMBASSADOR TO THE OPCW. REASONS: 1.5 (B
, D).

This is CWC-14-04.

OLYMPIC CHEMICAL PROTECTION MEASURES

1. (C) Greek OPCW Attache Vassilios Kraniotis provided us with an update on planning for a potential terrorist attack using chemical agents at the Olympic games. Most of these plans, he said, had been downgraded from "Confidential" to "Official Use Only" by his government, but he asked us to protect the information he provided. According to Kraniotis, chemical antidotes and detection equipment ordered from domestic and international suppliers are starting to come on-line. This includes chemical sensors to be placed at some Olympic venues. The military hospital in Athens has the lead in responding to any suspected attack, while twelve hospitals have been tasked with preparing to treat victims and provide other assistance.

2. (C) Kraniotis said that Greek officials are consulting with the OPCW, as well as with the U.S and a number of other countries, about contingency planning. Domestically, consultations have expanded beyond a core Counter-Terrorism group to include Olympic officials and numerous government departments involved with preparations for the games. To avoid heightening public fears, Kraniotis said, there is no plan to highlight these preparations in advance of the games. However, he anticipated that Greek and Olympic officials will publicly recognize the OPCW contribution to security when the games have ended.

UNIVERSALITY

3. (U) Huang Yu, Keith Wilson and Ioan Tudor of the TS External Relations Division hosted a January 13 meeting to discuss and possibly refine the concept of Points of Contact (POC) in the Action Plan. Four States Parties (SP) had nominated POCs: Chile nominated two individuals in its National Authority; Mexico nominated the office responsible for international organizations in its MFA; Poland nominated Krzysztof Paturej, MFA, with no specific regional focus noted; and the U.S. Huang reported that no SP had yet volunteered as a POC for African or Asian countries who had yet to join the CWC. The TS officials questioned the need for continued facilitations by Consuelo Femenia (Spain). They also reported receipt of recent voluntary contributions from Norway, China and South Korea and advised delegations that Huang had met with the Libyan Ambassador that morning and discussed possible TS assistance with its national implementation efforts. Huang noted that the workshop for National Authorities in Senegal would include universality elements, and that non-SPs and Libya had been invited to attend.

4. (U) Several other countries raised consideration of nominating a POC: France (in conjunction with its EU partners), Russia, India, Iran, Australia, and South Korea. Among the topics discussed were the lack of detail regarding how the POC efforts would work, what types of individuals or organizations other countries had nominated, and how the TS plans to structure and coordinate the POC effort. Netherlands, France, and Spain called for more structure, while the UK and Russia asked for continued flexibility, noting that one size does not fit all.

5. (U) China, France and the UK protested the focus on the POC issue, noting that the Action Plan had a variety of elements and requesting updates on those issues as well. China stated it was hosting the second regional meeting of Asian National Authorities and that universality issues would be included. Finally the Netherlands reported the EU had

sent demarches to all non-SPs, and that Belize acceded as a result.

MEETING OF EXPERTS TO REVIEW SCIENTIFIC ADVISORY BOARD
RECOMMENDATIONS

16. (U) The OPCW hosted a January 28-30 meeting to review the Note by the Director General's note on the Report of the Scientific Advisory Board (SAB) on Developments in Science and Technology and the recommendations of the SAB for the first Review Conference. Of particular importance was India's obstruction of the entire process as well as the subject matter, in addition to its refusal to support the draft Chairman's Report of facilitator Steve Wade (UK). India indicated that it would reopen various issues during the paper's presentation at the 36th Executive Council meeting, March 23-26.

17. (U) Delegations concurred with the SAB recommendation that relevant new chemicals be monitored but that the schedules of chemicals should not be amended at this time. They agreed that the SAB should continue to monitor trends in new chemical production technologies. Delegations were divided regarding the advisability of increasing the number of compounds referenced in the OPCW Central Analytical Database (OCAD), with India in particular opposed to any expansion. Delegations recommended that the SAB look for alternatives to GC-MS, particularly for portable on-site use during OCPF inspections. Delegations agreed that the SAB should consider how S&T developments might affect TS training programs and welcomed suggestions on how these developments might be incorporated into future training programs.

18. (U) Delegations also generally supported the SAB recommendation that the number of OCPF inspections be increased, as long as this effort does not interfere with the overall effectiveness of the verification regime (note: this also was supported by India). Delegations also welcomed continued SAB review of possible ways to improve activities associated with Article VI-related verification activities as well as those associated with verification of CW destruction programs. Delegations concurred that gaps in protective capabilities need to be identified, and welcomed SAB consideration of ways to improve OPCW outreach to the S&T community. Finally, delegations advised the SAB to consider OPCW International Cooperation and Assistance efforts, specifically how S&T developments might impact ICA programs.

19. (U) India, Iran, and South Africa challenged the SAB's work in general, stating that the SAB needed to consider initiatives in the political context in which they would be reviewed by States Parties. Canada intervened, stating that the SAB exceeded its authority by broaching political subjects and that in the future it should focus only on S&T work, and EC priorities would be set accordingly. OPCW representative Ralf Trapp responded that the SAB was an independent advisory body that is responsible for advising the DG on science and technology developments that could impact the CWC. Iran raised its concerns about implementation of Article XI, in particular requesting the SAB consider the issue of chemical transfers for peaceful purposes.

NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY (NIST)
CHEMICAL DATABASE

10. (U) At the request of the Technical Secretariat, Gary Mallard, DOC/NIST, presented NIST-developed chemical database software (InCHI) for Carlos Trentadue (TS/DEB) on January 12 as a potential way to augment TS outreach efforts to resource-challenged States Parties. The software allows for an end-user to input any number of synonyms (chemical names, structural formulas, or other common references) to generate a yes/no result for declaration purposes. The TS was very interested in the product and noted that such a database could assist States Parties lacking chemical/technical expertise in identifying Article VI-monitored chemicals for declaration purposes.

SAMPLING AND ANALYSIS PROCEDURES

11. (U) Discussions on procedures for Sampling and Analysis, held on January 12, went nowhere. States Parties remain divided over the presence of an observer (UK and Austria/Swiss on one side -- all the rest on the other side). The facilitator (Wills, Netherlands) was ill so Mallard facilitated and Brandon Williams sat in the chair. Del worked with the UK before the meeting to request them to reconsider, but with no agreement. The UK rationale is that they do not want an SP to influence the selection of a

laboratory, hold up analysis or tinker with the process. On the other side, SPs advocating the presence of an observer (France, in particular) argue that VA Part II, paras 49 and 50, provide the right for inspected SP access to information collected to support compliance judgments. Discussion concluded with no progress achieved.

12. (U) COMMENT: Del notes that the two sides focused on the presence of an observer and not the underlying reason why the observer is necessary, namely, the inspected SPs right to: 1) be ensured of seal/sample integrity and 2) timely access to raw data to allow for sufficient response (in alternative documentation, comments to a preliminary findings, or other means). In all other cases, to include challenge inspections, inspected SPs are guaranteed the right to inspector notebooks, offered opportunities to reconcile anomalies or questions on-site through additional/alternative records or physical access, and being briefed by inspection teams of preliminary findings on-site. Basically, inspected SPs are offered the opportunity to address concerns as they arise and be provided evidence against them to allow for sufficient response. Del suggests Washington evaluate whether options exist that address the two main points that do not involve a "look over the shoulder", but which accommodate the inspected SPs need for sufficient information and security.

CONSULTANTS

13. (U) In a January 22 lunch hosted by the French delegation, Sophie Moal-Makambe raised the future of General Gregoire Diamantidis, a consultant in the TS Verification Division, and asked the U.S. representatives their opinion of him. In response, the French noted that their support for moving the general from his current consultancy on optimization of verification activities to a Director position at the OPCW was tepid at best. They noted that Paris might take a different view, but at this point they had no instructions on this matter.

14. (U) Javits sends.
SOBEL